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Abstract 
The article offers an insider’s account of how the Paris Agreement on climate change was reached. Focusing on 
participation and ambition, it describes the efforts to include a long-term temperature goal, expectations for regular 
ratcheting up of climate efforts, and provisions for tracking global progress. The author argues that a shift from the 
earlier top-down approaches to setting targets, to a bottom-up, self-determined approach has spurred participation 
and made it easier to reach agreement. In addition, the Paris Agreement anchors a clearer direction of travel than 
before. The article also discusses the negotiations of the provisions in the Agreement to drive increased national 
climate mitigation efforts over time. Finally, the author considers the role of conference diplomacy, particularly the 
need for inclusive leadership. It is argued that the French Presidency combined a transparent negotiations process with 
a clear sense of direction that helped achieve a comprehensive and ambitious outcome. The role of back-channel talks 
as part of effective conference diplomacy is also discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
In the 25 years of UN climate change negotiations we 
have known that we can address global warming effec-
tively only if all countries with significant greenhouse gas 
emissions participate in a collective effort. Nevertheless, 
until Paris, all such attempts had been inadequate. 
The challenge in Paris was twofold: To ensure uni-
versal participation in a climate change agreement and 
to enhance climate efforts significantly (if not presently, 
then at least over time). An effective agreement would 
need to enhance both participation and ambition.  
Previous climate agreements have failed to deliver 
on both counts. The United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) from 1992 is uni-
versal but includes no quantitative emissions limitation 
targets. The Kyoto Protocol (1997) includes jointly de-
termined and legally binding targets, but only for in-
dustrialized countries. The Copenhagen Accord (2009) 
entails self-determined and nonbinding targets, but 
lacks a mechanism to assess the overall adequacy of ef-
forts or to ratchet up efforts.  
There has therefore been an inherent contradiction 
between participation and ambition in the climate 
change negotiations. 
The Paris Agreement meets the two criteria better 
than all previous attempts do. The Conference Presi-
dent, Laurent Fabius, the French Foreign Minister at 
the time of the Paris Conference, has characterized it 
as ‘the most balanced, comprehensive and ambitious 
result that we could hope to achieve’ (UNFCCC, 2016a). 
It is an agreement with universal participation.1 The 
Paris Agreement is legally binding; all parties have obli-
gations and rights. The core of the commitment is that 
all parties that join the Agreement will be legally bound 
to regularly prepare, update, and report on national 
mitigation targets and other contributions. The Agree-
                                                          
1 Only one party, Nicaragua, objected to the adoption of the 
Paris Agreement on 12 December 2015.  
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ment is durable and dynamic and works to progressive-
ly strengthen the global effort. All parties commit to 
pursue domestic mitigation measures with the aim of 
meeting their targets. Unlike commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol, however, parties’ reduction or limitation 
targets in the Paris Agreement are not legally binding. 
I will discuss the provisions in the Paris Agreement to 
create conditions for an international regime that pro-
motes the evolution of voluntary, cooperative behaviour 
in the absence of a strong UN authority to enforce co-
operation. The focus is on the so-called ambition mech-
anism in the Agreement. Conference President Fabius 
coined that term to include the provisions for a long-
term direction of travel, building expectations of pro-
gressive ratcheting up of national climate efforts and 
tracking global progress. 
Norway was deeply involved in the Paris end-game 
negotiations over these issues, following a request 
from the French Presidency. Fabius asked about a doz-
en of his ministerial colleagues to help facilitate the 
negotiation of some key political issues in the final 
high-level week of the Paris meeting. Typically, a pair of 
ministers, one from a developed country and one from 
a developing country, would co-chair such negotia-
tions. One such pair was Norway’s then Minister of 
Climate and Environment, Tine Sundtoft, and Saint Lu-
cia’s Minister for Sustainable Development and Energy, 
James Fletcher. They both had high credibility after 
participating in a large number of ministerial meetings 
leading up to Paris. 
The purpose of the Paris Agreement is to increase 
individual and global efforts on three fronts simultane-
ously: to mitigate emissions, to adapt to adverse ef-
fects of climate change, and to mobilize finance and 
support for the necessary transformation. In this arti-
cle, the focus is on mitigation. 
Section 2 looks into the issue of participation. I ar-
gue that the principle of ‘self-determination’ helped at-
tract wider participation. Section 3 discusses the impli-
cations of this principle for the possibility of enhancing 
collective climate efforts. Section 4 provides a more 
detailed account of how the so-called ambition mech-
anism was built into the Agreement, drawing on my 
own involvement in the negotiations in Paris, Section 5 
discusses how effective conference diplomacy can sig-
nificantly influence negotiation outcomes. The intense 
diplomatic engagement prior to and during the Paris 
Conference is highlighted. I argue that the French Pres-
idency helped secure an ambitious outcome. Back-
channel talks and informal coalitions were also instru-
mental in this regard. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
2. Attracting Participation through Self-Determination 
The main obstacle to universal participation in climate 
change agreements is widely seen to be the bifurcated 
nature of obligations for parties.  
The Convention and follow-up decisions place much 
stronger obligations on industrialized countries to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions. It has proven impossi-
ble to update the annexes that group countries by dif-
ferentiated obligations, despite that both economic 
capabilities and emissions patterns have evolved dra-
matically over the last 25 years.2 In the 1990s, emis-
sions by traditional industrialized countries still repre-
sented more than half of global emissions. Since then, 
global emissions have grown by more than 40%. OECD 
countries emit one third of the total, whereas develop-
ing countries account for the rest. The bifurcation and 
changing emission trends were at the core of previous 
negotiation rounds, such as the failed round in Copen-
hagen in 2009.  
Hence, overcoming bifurcation was seen as a criti-
cal condition to secure universal participation in the 
Agreement. In fact, this obstacle was actually ad-
dressed well ahead of the Paris Conference. The key to 
attracting broad participation was to introduce the 
principle of ‘self-determination’.  
Kallbekken, Sælen and Underdal (2014) have dis-
cussed why it is difficult to reach agreement on what 
constitutes an equitable and ambitious contribution 
from individual parties. What is fair and ambitious to 
one party might be seen as unjust and inadequate to 
another.  
A more flexible approach was widely seen as the vi-
able way forward. In the lead-up to Paris, there was a 
growing understanding that the approach needed to 
shift from what Liebreich (2015) has coined ‘top-down 
absolutism to bottom-up flexibility’. The jointly deter-
mined and legally binding emissions reduction targets in 
the Kyoto Protocol were replaced by bottom-up, non-
binding targets in Paris. The principle of self-
determination was anchored already two years ahead of 
Paris at the Climate Conference in Warsaw in 2013, 
where parties agreed that countries’ individual climate 
efforts under the new agreement should be prepared as 
‘nationally determined contributions’ (UNFCCC, 2013). 
This shift helped unleash an almost universal partic-
ipation. By the opening of the Paris Conference, 186 of 
the 196 parties had presented their nationally deter-
mined contribution. This is about twice the number of 
parties that presented voluntary pledges in Copenha-
gen in 2009 and Cancun in 2010. Taking into account 
the different national circumstances of parties, the 
                                                          
2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) has two annexes. Annex 1 is the developed 
country Party list—the 1992 OECD countries, the European 
Commission, and economies in transition (Russia, Ukraine, Bel-
arus, and some Eastern European states). Annex 2 is the donor 
country Party list, a subset of Annex 1 consisting of the then 
OECD countries and the European Commission. These annexes 
have not been updated since the Convention was adopted in 
1992. 
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bottom-up approach made it possible to arrive at more 
flexible and varied provisions than those in earlier 
agreements. The principle of self-determination con-
tributed to attracting wider participation in the climate 
change agreement than ever before. 
3. Driving Ambition Over Time 
Climate mitigation involves a free-rider problem. As 
Hovi, Skodvin and Aakre (2013, p. 140) argue, ‘actors 
have strong incentives to enjoy the benefits of other 
actors’ mitigation efforts while not contributing to mit-
igation themselves. Climate mitigation will thus likely 
be provided only in suboptimal quantities’. Thus, while 
self-determination facilitates wider participation, it 
cannot guarantee sufficient collective action. 
The trend of the contributions presented in Paris is 
that all parties pledge to do more than they have done 
before. Nevertheless, the individual plans do not add 
up to adequate mitigation efforts. 
The UNFCCC (2015, 2016b) found that aggregate 
global emissions levels resulting from what parties pre-
sented before the Paris Conference3 would overshoot 
the least-cost 2 °C scenario. The UNFCCC expects that 
the current contributions—if implemented as planned—
will slow down emissions growth by a third in the 2010–
2030 period, compared to the 1990–2010 period. 
If fully implemented, the pledges that governments 
made before the opening of the Paris Conference 
would limit warming to about 2.7 °C above pre-
industrial levels in 2100, according to the independent 
research consortium Climate Action Tracker (2015).4 
This compares to 3.6 °C by 2100, projected to result 
from current policies. Other studies have estimated 
higher temperature increases and it should be noted 
that aggregations are associated with uncertainty.5  
The situation before the opening of the Paris Con-
ference was that broad participation seemed to be 
within reach, while it was clear that the national tar-
gets put forward were inadequate. The main challenge 
for the end-game negotiations in Paris, therefore, was 
to find a way to build into the Agreement expectations 
that parties would significantly increase their climate 
efforts over time.  
Mosa and Dovland (2015, p. 1) noted an emerging 
                                                          
3 The updated UNFCCC synthesis report covers 189 countries, 
representing 95.7% of global emissions.  
4 Climate Action’s Tracker Consortium consists of four research 
organizations: Climate Analysis, Ecofys, the New Climate Insti-
tute, and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. 
5 Estimates are uncertain for a number of reasons: National 
pledges vary considerably in form and content, and many are 
difficult to quantify. It is not known whether pledges will be ful-
ly implemented or overachieved (several developing countries 
have stated in their pledges that they can do more with exter-
nal support). Future climate efforts later in the century, after 
the current pledges, are hard to predict. 
consensus before Paris among key negotiators con-
cerning what was needed, that is, a ‘hybrid agreement 
combining top-down and bottom-up elements with the 
aim of both broad participation and strong ambition’ 6  
Many delegations, including my own, saw the fol-
lowing elements as fundamental to a mechanism that 
could drive up ambitions over time: Firstly, securing a 
clear direction of travel in the Paris Agreement for a 
transition to low-emission societies. A long-term, glob-
al goal could provide such clarity. Secondly, capturing 
expectations that all parties need to enhance climate 
actions over time. Without progression, the long-term 
goal would not be credible. Thirdly, assurances that 
parties will actually do what they have pledged. Good 
reporting systems on progress towards meeting collec-
tive goals7 are essential to provide credibility to the 
long-term goal and to ensure transparency. 
This set of issues is referred to as the ‘ambition 
mechanism’ of the Paris Agreement.  
4. The Ambition Mechanism in the Paris Agreement 
Norway and Saint Lucia’s roles as deal brokers on the 
ambition mechanism in Paris proved to be as demand-
ing as we had expected. If taken at face value, the ne-
gotiation positions revealed that there was no common 
ground between the ‘must haves’ of some countries 
and the ‘red lines’ of others. In the end, consensus was 
reached through several late-stage night sessions, closed 
for all but country representatives. Closed night sessions 
are less crowded—only those parties with the keenest 
interest participate. Building consensus first among a 
few, representative participants before reporting to the 
full group can be an effective dealmaking strategy. Will-
ingness to compromise often increases as the deadline 
nears, as no party wants to be blamed for a failure.  
4.1. The Temperature Goal 
The Paris Agreement entails a sharpened long-term di-
rection of travel than previous agreements do. In Co-
penhagen in 2009, parties agreed to limit global warm-
ing to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. This goal is also 
reflected in the nonbinding Cancun Agreement (2010). 
In Paris, the goal was sharpened to keeping the in-
crease in global average temperature to well below 2 
°C, while pursuing efforts to further limit the tempera-
ture increase to 1.5 °C. 
The question of how to reflect the temperature 
goal proved perhaps the most difficult single issue that 
                                                          
6 Mosa and Dovland co-chaired an informal dialogue—
‘Towards 2015’—with key negotiators from more than 20 
countries. I write more on this dialogue in Section 5. 
7 Transparency and reporting on individual targets are also im-
portant, but was not covered by the set of issues faciliated by 
Norway and Saint Lucia.  
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 3, Pages 115-123 118 
Norway and Saint Lucia facilitated. Two negotiating 
groups, the alliance of small island states and of the 
least developed countries, had halting global warming 
at 1.5 °C as their top demand (Ousman Jarju, 2016). For 
the low-lying islands, rapid reduction of global emis-
sions is a matter of survival. However, both developed 
and developing countries voiced strong opposition to 
including a reference to 1.5 °C. Some of the oil-
producing developing countries were particularly hard-
line, as they perceived a more ambitious temperature 
goal as detrimental to their main export industry. The 
compromise came as part of an agreement on a sepa-
rate issue, the treatment of loss and damage resulting 
from the adverse effects of climate change. The United 
States and other OECD countries agreed to 1.5 °C as an 
aspirational goal in return for an explicit reference that 
provisions on loss and damage should not constitute 
any new liability or right to compensation.  
Paris represents an advance over previous agree-
ments also because the temperature goal is operation-
alized. Parties aim to reach global peaking as soon as 
possible and undertake rapid reductions thereafter. 
The aim is to achieve climate neutrality8 in the second 
half of this century.9 
Many parties argued in favour of a clearer time-
bound climate neutrality target. Some wanted both a 
short-term target year for global peaking and a long-
term target year for climate neutrality. They argued 
that it would be beneficial to agree on definite target 
years, as such agreement would facilitate the tracking 
of progress towards achieving the objectives of an 
agreement. However, ultimately parties did not feel 
comfortable about setting a short-term target year for 
global peaking for two reasons: because the scientific 
basis was unclear and because the question of how to 
deal with the understanding that developing countries 
would peak later was difficult to resolve. Similar con-
cerns hindered agreement on a definite target year for 
climate neutrality. 
It was nevertheless possible to agree on a stronger 
long-term goal than previously. Both the sharpened 
temperature goal and its operationalization in the Paris 
Agreement provide a clearer direction of travel.  
4.2. Enhancing Climate Action over Time 
An ambitious temperature goal is a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition to spur ambition. As noted, the 
                                                          
8 Defined in the Agreement as ‘a balance between anthropo-
genic greenhouse gas emissions by source and removal by 
sinks’. 
9 Assurances are provided to developing countries. In particu-
lar, it is acknowledged that peaking will take longer for devel-
oping countries and that the efforts should be undertaken on 
the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable develop-
ment and efforts to eradicate poverty. 
first-round national pledges presented before Paris are 
inadequate to keep the temperature increase well be-
low 2 °C. To become more credible, the regime should 
encourage progressively more ambitious climate action 
over time.  
The Paris Agreement delivers to some degree on 
that expectation. The Agreement states that successive 
rounds of national pledges will represent a progression 
beyond the current efforts. Furthermore, it also states 
that each party’s pledge will ‘reflect its highest possible 
ambition’. An update of self-determined climate pledg-
es should take place every five years, starting in 2020. 
From the outset, opposition was widespread 
against both of these elements. The principle of pro-
gression beyond current efforts was first agreed at the 
UN Climate Conference in Lima in 2014 (UNFCCC, 
2014). It was seen as a necessary assurance to balance 
the principle of self-determined contributions. Howev-
er, several parties were sceptical that this progression 
principle would apply also for future rounds of national 
pledges, perceiving that as too much interference in fu-
ture national sovereign decisions. Others voiced con-
cerns about ‘gaming’, that is, they feared that govern-
ments would present a low pledge because they would 
be expected to increase their efforts every five years. 
Ahead of the Paris Conference, only two countries, 
Switzerland and Norway, were clearly in favour of in-
cluding a ‘highest possible ambition’ principle. They 
saw this principle as essential in a regime with self-
determined climate targets. 
Eventually, the principle provides assurances to all 
negotiation groups. Developing countries perceived it 
as a reassurance that countries with the highest capa-
bilities should continue to take the lead. Many devel-
oped countries welcomed it because it builds into the 
Agreement the expectation that all parties will under-
take their best efforts. This group includes a number of 
countries that so far had no quantitative mitigation 
pledge under the UNFCCC. 
The principle was ultimately accepted. Its inclusion 
provides a dynamic element in the Paris Agreement. It 
encapsulates expectations that parties will regularly in-
crease their national climate actions, according to their 
best efforts.  
4.3. Taking Stock of Collective Progress 
Tracking global progress is the third element of the 
ambition mechanism. Transparency is essential to build 
trust and confidence in a multilateral regime. In an ef-
fective regime, one of the functions of a transparency 
system is to promote implementation and to monitor 
progress towards the objectives.  
While Norway and Saint Lucia did not facilitate the 
negotiations on the transparency of individual efforts, 
they were in charge of the negotiations on tracking col-
lective progress.  
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In Paris, it was agreed to periodically take global 
stock of the implementation of the Agreement. These 
stocktakes will assess the collective progress towards 
achieving the Agreement’s purpose and long-term 
goals.10 Furthermore, it was agreed that the outcome 
of the global stocktakes shall inform parties in updating 
and enhancing their subsequent national pledges. The 
global stocktakes will occur two years ahead of each 
new national pledging cycle. Thereby, the latest availa-
ble data will be available when formulating new, indi-
vidual climate action. The first report on global emis-
sions will be presented in 2018, followed by global 
stocktakes every five years. 
The system of regular global stocktakes was a con-
troversial one in the negotiations. Major developing 
countries were sceptical; they perceived this system as 
infringing on their national sovereignty. It was possible 
to reach agreement only by emphasizing the collective 
nature of the stocktakes. The adequacy of countries’ 
individual climate efforts will not be assessed. 
The inherent conflict between participation and 
ambition is therefore not fully resolved in the Paris 
Agreement. Nevertheless, the conflict is addressed 
more successfully than in previous agreements. Ulti-
mately, there was no direct trade off: Wide participa-
tion was secured without weakening expectations 
about future enhancement of national climate efforts.  
Taken together, the elements of the ambition 
mechanism could become a vehicle to progressively 
drive ambitions. If implemented, enhanced climate ac-
tion will follow from the obligation of regular ratchet-
ing up of self-determined efforts. The principles of pro-
gression and highest possible ambition anchor clear 
expectations. The regular stocktakes of collective ef-
forts will further guide future individual actions. There-
by, the ambition mechanism offers an opportunity for 
a ‘virtuous cycle’ for progression over time. 
The inherent free-riding problem is not resolved in 
the Paris Agreement: There is no guarantee that par-
ties will actually undertake what they commit to, that 
is to increase their efforts significantly over time. How-
ever, the Paris Agreement makes it is harder for the 
free rider to carry on unnoticed. In the absence of a 
strong UN authority to enforce cooperation, the ambi-
tion mechanism will be a political norm. The ambition 
mechanism provides a yardstick to measure perfor-
mance and progress (or lack thereof), including a 
commonly agreed benchmark for informal ‘blaming 
and shaming’. Nevertheless, in any international re-
gime that promotes voluntary, cooperative behaviour, 
the future effectiveness in largely determined by politi-
cal will.  
                                                          
10 The global stocktakes will also include an assessment of pro-
gress towards the adaptation and climate finance objectives, 
not discussed here. 
5. Conference Diplomacy: Negotiating the Climate 
Deal  
Climate diplomacy rose to unprecedented levels in the 
two years prior to the Paris Conference. There was a 
plethora of diplomatic initiatives. France launched a 
number of events, individually and together with Peru, 
the preceding Presidency of UN Climate Conference. The 
United States, Germany, the European Union, and many 
others held high-level workshops and dialogues. The US–
China presidential summits in 2014 and 2015, which led 
to a crucially important agreement between the two 
countries (White House, 2015), were but two of many 
bilateral meetings on climate change. Several countries 
instructed their embassies to file weekly reports on cli-
mate-related developments in their hosts’ countries. 
Such climate diplomacy efforts were geared to-
wards exploring possible compromises prior to the final 
negotiations rounds. Back-channel negotiations outside 
the formal UN setting were critical to understand the 
concerns of others and to construct elements of com-
prehensive consensus solutions.  
Such initiatives also included unofficial dialogues 
providing a more secure environment for frank, off-
the-record exchanges. This environment resembles so-
called Track 2 Diplomacy, which is ‘a process designed 
to assist official leaders…by exploring possible solutions 
out of the public view and without the requirements of 
formal negotiations or bargaining for an advantage’ 
(Montville, 2006, p. 16). Gambia’s minister of the envi-
ronment, Pa Ousman Jarju (2016), has highlighted the 
contributions of one such unofficial initiative, the To-
wards 2015 International Climate Dialogue. This initia-
tive assembled key negotiators from more than 20 
countries in an 18-month sequence of meetings. Dir-
inger (2015) has analysed how this dialogue reached 
broad consensus on many of the concepts that later 
were included in the Paris Agreement. 
5.1. The Role of the French Presidency 
The timing of the Conference was opportune for a suc-
cessful result. There was a growing appreciation about 
the urgency. A ‘now or never’ sensation increased po-
litical will. In addition, reports such as the ones from 
the Global Commission on Economy and Climate un-
derscored the opportunities for green transformation 
(New Climate Economy, 2014, 2015).  
The French Presidency cleverly enhanced these fa-
vourable trends at the Paris Conference. Together with 
Peru, they launched a high level ‘action agenda’ where 
solutions were demonstrated and new partnerships 
were developed. In addition, France invited heads of 
states and governments to the opening of the Confer-
ence. At previous conferences, ministers had come on-
ly towards the end. Building political momentum at the 
opening of the Conference was a novel idea, and one 
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that proved successful.11 It resulted in an unprecedent-
ed manifestation of political will. 
The French Presidency also prepared parties well 
before the Conference. A series of high-level meetings 
were organized on specific themes. The Presidency in-
troduced a new procedure at these pre-meetings. Min-
isters would only be allowed short general remarks in a 
plenary setting (drawing mostly from written state-
ments). Then, ministers were divided into break-out 
groups and asked to answer pointed questions which 
had not been circulated in advance. This setting 
spurred more focused discussions and true dialogue. 
This innovative organization of pre-meetings contrib-
uted to better understanding of parties’ concerns and 
explored bridging proposals. In many ways, these pre-
meetings mirrored the end-game negotiations and 
paved the way for the compromises made at the Paris 
Conference. 
At the Conference itself, President Fabius and his 
team shepherded the process inclusively and transpar-
ently. In Paris, before presenting the final text for adop-
tion, the Presidency had extensive consultations with 
major countries and all negotiating groups. I witnessed 
this impressive conference diplomacy first-hand as I had 
the privilege to work on some last-minute textual solu-
tions together with members of the French team.  
Another factor was that the Presidency managed to 
transcend any perceptions that France was firmly in 
the EU camp. The French team convincingly portrayed 
themselves as open to all parties, understanding the 
concerns of all. French politicians and officials under-
took impressive diplomatic efforts leading up to Paris. 
France had strategic dialogues with all critical countries 
well ahead of the Conference. Members of the French 
government crisscrossed the world. This huge and criti-
cal diplomatic effort helped lay the foundation for an 
outcome that exceeded the expectations of many ob-
servers and negotiators.12 
In addition, the Presidency consistently communi-
cated a clear sense of direction. They showed clear 
leadership. It was clear to all that France did not want 
merely an agreement with universal participation, but 
a comprehensive and ambitious one. At one point in 
their roles as facilitators, Norway and Saint Lucia had 
to report to the Presidency that if a consensus text on 
the temperature goal were to be presented at that 
time, the high-ambition option would have to be taken 
off the negotiating table. Conference President Fabius 
strongly advised us to keep the high-end options in the 
                                                          
11 In Copenhagen in 2009, heads of states and governments ar-
rived towards the end of the conference, complicating the end-
game negotiations.  
12 The author participated in the “Predicting Paris: Multi-Method 
Approaches to Forecast the Outcomes of Global Climate Nego-
tiations” study discussed by Sprinz et al. (2016) in this volume. 
My own predictions were on the low side of the outcome. 
revised text. Behind the scenes, France worked suc-
cessfully to get the strongest opponents on board, 
among them three G20 countries. Whenever the lim-
ited leverage of small-power facilitators such as Nor-
way and Saint Lucia became obvious, France and other 
major powers employed high-level diplomacy to secure 
a comprehensive and ambitious deal.  
5.2. A New Force in the Negotiations: The High 
Ambition Coalition  
Several back-channel groups across the negotiation 
blocks underpinned the leadership of the French Presi-
dency. The most influential turned out to be a group 
very few had heard of before Paris. It became known 
as the High Ambition Coalition.13 In a situation where re-
gion and development levels define the formal negotiat-
ing blocks, this group was inclusive yet remained small 
for most of the Conference. The core group consisted of 
about a dozen countries. Apart from the European Un-
ion, small countries originally made up the group.14  
The High-Ambition Coalition became a game 
changer through a remarkable snowball effect in Paris. 
At a press conference two days before the end of the 
Conference, the United States for the first time emerged 
publicly as part of the group, and was followed by Brazil 
the following day. Before the end of the Conference, 
over a hundred countries supported the messages of 
this loose coalition calling for a comprehensive and 
strong agreement (Climate Change News, 2015). 
Tony de Brum, Foreign Minister of the Republic of 
the Marshall Islands at the time, masterfully led the 
High Ambition Coalition. In the lead-up to the Paris 
Climate Conference, he called meetings in the core 
ministerial group four times, on the margins of other 
climate-related meetings.15 The Marshall Islands was 
an ideal champion, with an exceptionally experienced 
minister and resourceful negotiation team. The country 
is also a ‘moral superpower’. Consisting of low-lying 
coral atolls rising only a few feet above sea level, it is 
more vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change than most other countries are. 
The European Commission (EC) and Norway played 
key roles in building this back-channel diplomacy. 
Commissioner Arias Canete has called it ‘the masterplan 
                                                          
13 Former US Climate Envoy Todd Stern came up with this 
name in the first full meeting of the group the United States at-
tended, a working dinner in Paris, 6 December 2015. 
14 The last ministerial meeting Norway and the EU Commission 
organised, held on 17 May 2015 in Berlin, had representatives 
from 13 parties: Angola, the EU Commission, Gambia, Germa-
ny, Grenada, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Mexico, Nor-
way, Peru, Saint Lucia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
15 The 2015 progressive ministerial meetings took place as fol-
lows: 17 May in Berlin, 20 July in Paris, 28 September in New 
York, and 8 November in Paris. There were also several meet-
ings during the Paris Conference itself.  
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of Europe and its allies conceived over the year’ and 
argues that the first meeting of the group was held on 
17 May 2015 (EC, 2015, p. 1). In fact, the basis of the 
coalition was established already during the Climate 
Conference in Durban in 2011. The group was the 
brainchild of Connie Hedegaard (personal communica-
tion, 21 February 2016), the energetic former EU 
Commissioner for Climate Action. She saw the need to 
bring together ministers from ambitious countries. Erik 
Solheim (personal communication, 23 February 2016), 
then Norway’s Minister of the Environment, was also 
enthusiastic about the idea of bringing together minis-
ters with similar mindsets across different negotiation 
groups to help find ambitious compromises. The EU 
Commission and Norway continued to convene minis-
ters from ‘progressive countries’ from 2011 onwards. 
They typically funded and co-chaired such informal 
ministerial meetings twice a year. The coalition contin-
ued despite changes of ministers. Norway’s minister 
Tine Sundtoft co-chaired several meetings in this for-
mat, both with Connie Hedegaard and with her succes-
sor, Miguel Arias Canete. Norway and the EU Commis-
sion invited the Marshall Islands to co-chair a meeting 
in May 2015 in Berlin,16 after which Foreign Minister 
Tony de Brum took over as convener.  
Outside the limelight of official meetings, the coali-
tion had met at both the ministerial and the lead nego-
tiator levels throughout the year. In the lead-up to Par-
is, the group discussed what strategies to pursue to get 
a strong agreement. Members of the group tried to cre-
ate mutual trust and to find common ground. They 
worked on concrete language solutions on some of the 
politically most contested issues. Positions were aligned, 
where possible. In the negotiation rooms, delegates 
from the coalition pushed for ambitious outcomes. They 
echoed and supported each other, even before other 
parties realized that views had been aligned through 
back-channel diplomacy over the course of the year. The 
outcome regarding the ambition mechanism eventually 
was very close to the demands by the coalition: ‘A firm 
recognition of the below 1.5 degrees temperature goal; 
a collective mitigation pathway entailing deep cuts by 
mid-Century and five-yearly common political moments 
to revisit mitigation targets, informed by five-yearly 
global stocktakes’ (Bialek, 2015). 
The informal coalition was instrumental in keeping 
the more ambitious options on the table in the final 
round of negotiations. The group created ‘a political 
space’ for the French Presidency to ensure ambition in 
the final draft Agreement. Some of the major develop-
ing countries had long argued in favour of a limited 
agreement. Such an agreement would have few details 
and very little guidance on how to enhance efforts in 
                                                          
16 Mary Robinson, UN Special Envoy for Climate Change at the 
time, advised us to include a developing country in the leader-
ship of the progressive ministerial meetings. 
the future. These developing countries could no longer 
hide behind poorer developing countries with little ca-
pacity, because many of the most vulnerable countries 
had become vocal champions of high ambition.  
The High Ambition Coalition contributed to the 
making of a comprehensive and strong agreement. In 
the closing days in Paris, the narrative was changing: 
The divide was not so much between North and South, 
but rather between those who wanted a strong and 
ambitious deal and those who did not. The coalition 
helped bridge the unhelpful and rigid bifurcation be-
tween developed and developing countries. In the are-
as facilitated by Norway and Saint Lucia,17 this back-
channel dialogue clearly helped tip the balance and in-
fluenced the final outcome. 
6. Conclusion 
The Paris Agreement represents the culmination of 
years of climate diplomacy. From my vantage point as 
Chief Negotiator of Norway, I am convinced that the 
comprehensive outcome in Paris may in part be at-
tributed to the unpreceded diplomatic efforts during 
and prior to the Paris Conference. Conference diplo-
macy impacted negotiation outcomes. 
In this article, the importance of inclusive leader-
ship is emphasized. I argue that the French Presidency 
combined a transparent negotiations process with a 
clear sense of direction that helped navigate the Paris 
Agreement into the more ambitious end of the spec-
trum of possible results. An illustration is offered 
where the Presidency refused a middle-ground com-
promise and instead pursued bilateral high-level di-
plomacy to secure the high-ambition options. 
I also discuss the important role of back-channel 
negotiations. Effective conference diplomacy must cut 
across formal negotiation blocks and build bridges. I 
particularly look at the emergence and impact of one 
informal group, the High Ambition Coalition. Its for-
mation softened the rigid divide between North and 
South and helped forge compromises. 
The Paris Agreement has mobilized almost univer-
sal participation through nationally determined contri-
butions. Self-determination is at the heart of many 
provisions. This shift from previous top-down ap-
proaches has spurred participation.  
In addition, the Agreement anchors a clearer direc-
tion of travel than before. Provisions are built into the 
Agreement to enhance national climate efforts progres-
sively over time. Thereby, the inherent conflict between 
broad participation and ambition in climate change ne-
gotiations has been resolved in the Paris Agreement 
more successfully than in previous agreements.  
                                                          
17 Worth noting is that the Presidency chose ministers in this 
core group of the coalition to facilitate the ambition mecha-
nism. 
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The first round of self-determined climate action 
does not add up to what is needed to meet global tar-
gets. However, the Paris outcome cannot be judged 
solely by looking at the emissions reduction targets 
that were put forward prior to the Paris Conference. 
The Paris Agreement is a hybrid between bottom-up 
flexibility and top-down guidance. One of the keys to 
bringing both developed and developing countries into 
legally bound provisions is the self-determined nature 
of several provisions, combined with a mechanism to 
regularly ratchet up efforts. Given future political will, 
that combination could become a vehicle to increase 
climate ambitions significantly over time.  
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